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Abstract. The hardness of finding short vectors in ideals of cyclotomic
number fields (hereafter, Ideal-SVP) can serve as a worst-case assump-
tion for numerous efficient cryptosystems, via the average-case problems
Ring-SIS and Ring-LWE. For a while, it could be assumed the Ideal-SVP
problem was as hard as the analog problem for general lattices (SVP),
even when considering quantum algorithms.
But in the last few years, a series of works has lead to a quantum al-
gorithm for Ideal-SVP that outperforms what can be done for general
SVP in certain regimes. More precisely, it was demonstrated (under cer-
tain hypotheses) that one can find in quantum polynomial time a vector
longer by a factor at most α = exp(O˜(n1/2)) than the shortest non-zero
vector in a cyclotomic ideal lattice, where n is the dimension.
In this work, we explore the constants hidden behind this asymptotic
claim. While these algorithms have quantum steps, the steps that im-
pact the approximation factor α are entirely classical, which allows us to
estimate it experimentally using only classical computing. Moreover, we
design heuristic improvements for those steps that significantly decrease
the hidden factors in practice. Finally, we derive new provable effective
lower bounds based on volumetric arguments.
This study allows to predict the crossover point with classical lattice re-
duction algorithms, and thereby determine the relevance of this quantum
algorithm in any cryptanalytic context. For example we predict that this
quantum algorithm provides shorter vectors than BKZ-300 (roughly the
weakest security level of NIST lattice-based candidates) for cyclotomic
rings of rank larger than about 24000.
Keywords: Quantum Cryptanalysis, Cyclotomic Ideal Lattices.
1 Introduction
The shortest vector problem (hereafter, SVP), that is the problem of finding
the shortest vector of a Euclidean lattice, is a central hard problem in complex-
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ity theory. An approximated version (approx-SIVP) can serve as a theoretical
foundation for many cryptographic constructions thanks to the worst-case to
average-case reductions of Ajtai [Ajt99] — a classical reduction from approx-
SVP to the Short Integer Solution (SIS) problem — and Regev [Reg09] — a
quantum reduction from approx-SIVP to Learning with Errors (LWE).
However, the efficiency of schemes based on plain SIS and LWE remains un-
satisfactory, and one may prefer to rely on certain structured lattices, namely
lattices that are also modules over certain rings, as done by the NTRU cryptosys-
tem [HPS98], and more recently by many more cryptosystems based on Ring-SIS
and Ring-LWE. The Ring-SIS and Ring-LWE problems also enjoy worst-case to
average-case reductions from a variant of approx-SIVP3 for lattices that are ide-
als in some ring [Mic07, SSTX09, LPR10, SS11, PRSD17]. The typical choice of
ring is the integer ring of a cyclotomic number field Q(ωm), of degree n = ϕ(m),
where ωm is a primitive m-th root of unity. One notable exception is the NTRU
Prime cryptosystem [BCLvV17], which was designed to mitigate the potential
cryptanalytic risk that we are about to discuss.
The assumption that approx-SIVP is as hard in ideal lattices as in general
lattices was challenged by Campbell et al. [CGS14], who sketched a quantum
polynomial-time attack against a few schemes using so-called principal ideals
(Soliloquy, and the fully-homomorphic encryption scheme of [SV10]). Following
the claims of Campbell et al., Biasse and Song [BS16] proved that the Principal
Ideal Problem could be efficiently solved using a quantum computer. In other
words, given a principal ideal, one may recover an arbitrary generator in quantum
polynomial time. Analyzing the geometry of cyclotomic units in the log-unit
lattice, Cramer et al. [CDPR16] also confirmed that the secret key (a short
generator) of the few aforementioned schemes could be recovered exactly, due to
their specific distribution.
Furthermore, it is also proven in [CDPR16] that from an arbitrary generator,
one could asymptotically recover a short one, with an approximation factor of
α = exp(O˜(n1/2)). A generalization to all ideals (i.e., not necessarly principal)
was provided in [CDW17]. They showed that by exploiting the Stickelberger class
relations, one could efficiently find a sub-ideal b ⊂ a (i.e., an integral multiple)
such that b is principal, and such that |b/a| ≤ exp(O˜(n3/2)) (i.e., the sub-ideal is
not much sparser than the original lattice). Putting both results together leads
to an approximation factor of α = exp(O˜(n1/2)) also for non-principal ideals.
Nevertheless, the work of [CDW17] still leaves two obstacles for cryptanalytic
applications of their algorithm to the widespread hardness assumptions Ring-
SIS, Ring-LWE and NTRU:
1. The approximation factor in the worst-case is asymptotically too large to af-
fect any actual Ring-LWE based scheme, which typically rely on polynomial
approximation factors α = poly(n).
2. Ring-SIS and Ring-LWE are known to be at least as hard as Ideal-SIVP [Mic07,
SS11, LPR13] but not known to be equivalent. In fact, problems like Ring-
SIS, Ring-LWE and NTRU, are naturally phrased as short vector problems
3 For cyclotomic ideal lattices, approx-SVP and approx-SIVP are trivially equivalent.
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in module lattices of rank k ≥ 2. An approach for such a converse reduction
would be to generalize LLL over other rings than Z, but this seems to fail
since only a few cyclotomic rings of small degree are Euclidean [Len75].
This work. In this work, we are interested in precisely quantifying the obstacle 1
above. It is proven in [CDPR16] that the short generator that can be recovered is
asymptotically close to optimal, yet it is unclear how this asymptotic statement
translates in practice. One could fear that the hidden factors in α = exp(O˜(n1/2))
make α small enough in practice to threaten concrete cryptosystems (assuming
obstacle 2 can also be tackled). Or, on the contrary, one could doubt that this
algorithm is ever to give better results than classical methods for reasonable
dimensions, given how small the Hermite factor η = 1.022n of LLL [LLL82]
already is in practice [NS06].4
After some preliminaries in Section 2, we recall in Section 3 the main steps
for solving Ideal-SVP [CGS14, EHKS14, CDPR16, BS16, CDW17]. We discuss
the slackness of the bounds derived in these works, and we identify the more
meaningful quantities that should be studied to predict more precisely the Her-
mite factor achieved by the algorithm. We note that we do not need to resort to
a quantum computer to experiment with those meaningful quantities, at least by
making an informed assumption on the input distribution of the relevant steps
(see Assumption 8 and the subsequent discussion). All working hypotheses are
summarized in Section 3.4.
We then propose in Section 4 several heuristic techniques, designed to im-
prove in practice the meaningful quantities determined above. First, we propose
to exploit the knowledge of Θ(d2) many short vectors of both the Stickelberger
and log-unit lattices and go beyond what can be done with just a basis (where d is
the dimension). To properly exploit a large number of short vectors, we propose
to use an approximate Voronoi-cell-based algorithm [MV10, Laa16, DLdW19],
adapted to our specific setting, where we wish to minimize some carefully deter-
mined meaningful quantities rather than the Euclidean distance.
In Section 5, we discuss our implementation, and report on the experimental
behavior of both the original algorithm, and our heuristically improved variant.
We observe that the experimental behavior asymptotically matches with the
upper bound, and we experimentally determine the hidden constants. We also
note that our heuristic variant indeed improves these hidden constants, especially
for the Approx-CVP step in the log-unit lattice.
Finally, we study in Section 6 the volumetric lower-bounds for the CVP in-
stances. We determine the effective asymptotic behaviour of those lower bounds
(i.e., without hidden constants). We note that our bound for the log-unit lattice
is not only effective, but also asymptotically better than the one of [CDPR16].
We also perform numerical experiments, which show that the convergence to the
asymptotic behaviour is sufficiently fast to allow reliable use of the estimates.
4 In the rest of this work, we prefer to use the so called Hermite factor η instead of
the approximation factor α; this is justified in Remark 1.
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We conclude in Section 7 with a summary of our effective asymptotic pre-
dictions. Combining these results, we compare the predicted performance with
that of the classical lattice reduction algorithms LLL and BKZ, in Figure 5. For
a concrete example, we predict that the crossover point between the original
algorithm and LLL happens for cyclotomic ideals of rank around 4000, and our
heuristic improvement brings this crossover point down to rank 1000. We con-
clude our work by summarizing the limits of the conclusions that can be drawn
from this work regarding cryptanalytic concerns.
Concurrent work. Recently, Pellet–Mary, Hanrot and Stehlé proposed [PMHS19]
a heuristic algorithm that should reach even lower approximation factors than
discussed above, but at the cost of a pre-computation using exponential time
and memory, and a computation using sub-exponential time and memory. It also
makes use of the approx-CVP algorithm of Laarhoven [Laa16, DLdW19, SD19],
but in a different regime, and in a lattice with much less structure. In would be
interesting to find an efficient simulation of their precomputation phase, so as to
be able to run more extensive experiments and estimate the hidden constants,
possibly using the heuristic improvements introduced in this paper.
2 Preliminaries
Vectors are to be read as column-vectors. Matrices are denoted by capital letters.
We write a matrix B as B = (b1, · · · , bn) where bi is the i-th column vector of
B. We denote by B? = (b?0, · · · , b?n−1) the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization of
the matrix B.
2.1 Geometry
Norms, asymmetric norms, pseudo-norms. We will use the `1, `2 (Eu-
clidean) and `∞ norms, respectively defined by ‖x‖1 =
∑ |xi|, ‖x‖2 = √∑x2i
and ‖x‖∞ = max |xi|. Beware that, contrary to some of the literature, the nota-
tion ‖ · ‖ does not refer by default to the Euclidean norm, but is a place-holder
for any norm, asymmetric norm or pseudo-norm (defined below).
We will make use of two weakened notions of norm during this paper. We
recall that a norm ‖ · ‖ : V → [0,+∞) on a real vector space V is a function
satisfying the three following axioms:
1. Sub-additivity: ‖x+ y‖ ≤ ‖x‖+ ‖y‖ for all x, y ∈ V ,
2. Absolute homogeneity: ‖ax‖ = |a| · ‖x‖ for all a ∈ R, x ∈ V ,
3. Positive definiteness: ‖x‖ = 0 ⇒ x = 0 for all x ∈ V .
An asymmetric norm ‖ · ‖ : V → [0,+∞) is a function verifying axioms 1
and 3 and the following positive homogeneity axiom:
4. Positive homogeneity: ‖ax‖ = a · ‖x‖ for all a ≥ 0, x ∈ V .
Finally, in this article we will call a pseudo-norm a function ‖·‖ : V → [0,+∞)
verifying the axiom 1 and the following linear monotonicity axiom:
5. Linear monotonicity: ‖ax‖ ≥ ‖x‖ for all a ≥ 1.
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Lattices. A lattice Λ is a discrete subgroup of a finite-dimensional Euclidean
vector space Rn (or Hermitian vector space Cn/2 ' Rn). A lattice admits a basis,
that is a matrix B ∈ Rd×n such that Λ = B · Zn for some n ≤ d; n is called the
dimension of the lattice. Its volume is defined by Vol(L) =
√
det(BtB) for any
basis B of Λ (this measure is independent of the choice of the basis).
To quantify the shortness of a vector v ∈ Λ, we use the so-called Hermite
factor η = ‖v‖2/Vol(Λ)1/n (where n = dim(Λ)) instead of the approximation
factor α = ‖v‖2/λ1(Λ) (where λ1(Λ) = minw∈Λ\{0} ‖w‖2), as the minimal length
of a lattice is typically not known exactly. Note that this choice does not affect
the comparison of reduction performances between different algorithms.
Remark 1. While the latter approximation factor α is often preferred in worst-
case complexity theory, the former Hermite factor η is typically more relevant and
convenient for average-case cryptanalysis. Note that from Minkowski’s theorem,
we have λ1(Λ) ≤ (1+O(1/n))
√
2n/pieVol(Λ)1/n; moreover, for cyclotomic ideal
lattices we also have λ1(Λ) ≥ Vol(Λ)1/n. Therefore, the ratio between both
measure is reasonably well controlled: α/η ∈ [1, (1+O(1))√2n/pie]. The extreme
case α/η = 1 is reached by orthogonal lattices, and for random lattices the
gaussian heuristic predicts α/η ≈√n/2pie.
Close vector algorithm We recall from [Bab86] two polynomial time algo-
rithms RoundOff and NearestPlane (as Algorithms 1 and 2) for solving the close
vector problem given a basis of short vectors. The output v is guaranteed to
lie in the parallelepiped t+ P(B) for RoundOff and t+ P(B?) for NearestPlane,
where
P(B) =
{∑
αibi|αi ∈ [−1/2, 1/2)
}
.
This allows to bound ‖v − t‖, depending on the quality of the basis B, and
of considered norm ‖ · ‖.
Algorithm 1 RoundOff(B, t)
Require: A basis B of a full-rank lattice L ⊂ Rn, a target point t ∈ Rn.
Ensure: A lattice vector v ∈ L close to t: v − t ∈ P(B)
1: x← B−1t
2: y ← (bx1e, . . . , bxne)
3: v ← By
4: return v
2.2 Number Theory
Cyclotomic number fields. Throughout this paper, m denotes the power of
a prime, ωm is a primitive m-th root of unity, and K = Q(ωm) is the m-th
cyclotomic number field. It is a number field of degree n = ϕ(m) = Θ(m). We
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Algorithm 2 NearestPlane(B, t)
Require: A basis B of a full-rank lattice L ⊂ Rn, a target point t ∈ Rn.
Ensure: A lattice vector v ∈ L close to t: v − t ∈ P(B?)
1: f ← t
2: v ← 0
3: for i = n downto 1 do
4: y ← 〈t, b?i 〉/‖b?i ‖2
5: zi = bye
6: f ← f − zibi
7: v ← v + zibi
8: end for
9: return v
denote by G its Galois group over Q, while τ ∈ G denotes complex conjugation.
We recall that G ' (Z/mZ)×, by constructing the automorphism σi ∈ G : ω 7→
ωi for any i ∈ (Z/mZ)×. Complex conjugation corresponds to −1, i.e., τ = σ−1.
The norm of an element x ∈ K is given by Nx = ∏σ∈G σ(x), and it holds that
Nx ∈ Q for any element x ∈ K.
We recall that the discriminant ∆K of cyclotomic number fields K asymp-
totically satisfies log |∆K | = O(n log n) [Was12]. More specifically, for any prime
power conductor m = pk, the discriminant of Q(ωpk) is ±ppk−1(pk−k−1).
Ideals of OK . The ring of integers of K is denoted OK = Z[ωm]. An integral
ideal h ⊂ OK is an additive subgroup closed under multiplication by any element
of the ring; more precisely ∀a ∈ OK , ah ⊂ h. A fractional ideal f ⊂ K is an ideal
of the form f = 1sh for some scalar s ∈ Z. Unless specified to be integral, ideals
will be considered to be fractional.
The elements (g1, ..., gr) are generators of the ideal f when f =
∑
i giOK . In
particular, when the ideal is generated by a single element, it is called principal.
For an integral ideal h ⊂ OK , the quotient OK/h is finite and Nh = |OK/h|
is the norm of the ideal h. When h is principal, there is an element h such
that h = hOK , and the norm of h coincides with the algebraic norm of h, i.e.,
Nh = Nh.
Ideals as lattices. The field K is endowed with a canonical structure of
Hermitian vector space via its Minkowski embedding. That is, letting ζm =
exp(2ıpi/m) ∈ C, and letting ψi : K → C be the field morphism sending ωm to
ζim for each i ∈ (Z/mZ)× coprime to m, each elements e ∈ K is identified with
the vector ψ(e) = (ψi(e))i∈(Z/mZ)× ∈ Cn. By abuse of notation, we often identify
the elements e and ψ(e); in particular,‖e‖α refers to ‖ψ(e)‖α for α ∈ {1, 2,∞}.
Any ideal h of OK can be viewed as a Euclidean lattice via the above embed-
ding. The volume of h as a lattice relates to its algebraic norm via the equation
Vol(h) =
√|∆K |Nh.
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Class group. The class group ClK = IK/PK of K is the quotient of the
(abelian) multiplicative group of fractional ideals IK by the subgroup of principal
ideals. We denote by [h] the class of the ideal h in ClK . The trivial class [OK ]
is the class of principal ideals. The class group is written multiplicatively. The
minus-part Cl−K of the class group is defined as the kernel of the relative norm
map NK/K+ : ClK → ClK+ , [h] 7→ [hhτ ], where K+ is the maximal real subfield
of K, and hτ denotes the complex conjugation of h.
The class number hm = |ClK | is the order of the class group. Denoting
h+m = |ClK+ | and h−m = |Cl−K | we have hm = h+m · h−m.
Galois group ring. The Galois group ring R = Z[G] is the set of formal linear
combinations of elements of G with integral coefficients. The group operation of
G is extended to a multiplication law in R, providing R with a ring structure.
The ring R acts naturally on the ideals of OK as follows : let s =
∑
σ∈G sσσ ∈ R
and let h be an ideal of OK , then we define the action of s on h as
hs =
∏
σ∈G
σ(h)sσ .
2.3 Cyclotomic log-unit lattice
We abusively call units of K the elements of the group O×K . The embeddings of
K are all complex, and such that ψi = ψ−i, hence |ψi| = |ψ−i|, so we define the
set of indices I = (Z/mZ)× /{±1}. The logarithmic embedding
Log : K× → Rn/2
x 7−→ x = (log(|ψi(x)|))i∈I
defines a group homomorphism. The Dirichlet Unit Theorem ensures that Λ =
Log(O×K) is a lattice (called the log-unit lattice) of rank n/2− 1. The projection
of the log-embedding of an element x on the all-1 vector 1 = (1, . . . , 1) directed
line is proportional to the logarithm of its algebraic norm log(Nx). In particular,
as the algebraic norm is multiplicative, the algebraic norm of a unit is ±1 and
Λ ⊥ Span(1). We denote by H the orthogonal complement of Span(1), the
minimal vector space supporting the log-unit lattice Λ. Conversely, we define a
reciprocal function to Log, that is
Exp : Rn/2 → Rn
(x1, . . . , xn/2) 7→ (exp(x1), exp(x1), . . . , exp(xn/2), exp(xn/2))
Up to reordering of coefficients, we have that (|ψi(x)|)i∈(Z/mZ)× = Exp(Log(x)),
in particular ‖Exp(Log(x))‖2 = ‖x‖2.
Not only do we know the structure of the units of OK by Dirichlet’s Theorem,
but in the case of cyclotomic fields of prime-power conductor we also have an
explicit set of relatively short vectors (namely, the Log bij ’s defined below) which
generate a finite index sublattice of the log-unit lattice Λ.
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More precisely, with ζ ∈ K a primitive m-th root of unity, we define the
multiplicative group V generated by ±ζ and the elements zi = ζi − 1, for 1 ≤
i ≤ m− 1. Then, the cyclotomic units are defined as C = V ∩O×K . The elements
bij =
zi
zj
(when only one index is given bi, we refer to bi1) are units of OK .
Then, the sublattice LogC is generated by the vectors (Log bi)i∈I\{1}. The index
[Λ : LogC] and the length of the vectors Log bij are controlled by the following
results.
Theorem 1 (See [Was12] Thm. 8.2 and Exercise 8.5.). For any prime
power m > 2, the index of the log-unit lattice Λ over LogC is
[Λ : LogC] = h+m <∞.
Corollary 2 (Corollary of [CDPR16], Lemma 6.7.) Letm = pk be a prime
power. Then, ‖Log bij‖ = O(
√
m).
The two above statements allow to establish upper bounds on how well one
can solve the close vector problem in this lattice Λ. Lower bounds can also be
established by volumetric arguments, as done in [CDPR16]. In particular, they
established that Vol(Λ)1/(n/2−1) ≥ Ω(√m/ logm). We provide the following
better estimate.
Theorem 3. For prime powers m, we have Vol(Λ)
1
n/2−1 ∼ √m/2.
The proof is deffered to Appendix B.
2.4 Stickelberger lattice
Let us define the Stickelberger lattice S as the Z[G]-multiples in Z[G] of the
Stickelberger element
θ =
∑
a∈(Z/mZ)×
{ a
m
}
σ−1a ∈ Q[G],
where {x} denotes the fractional part x−bxc of the rational number x. In other
words, S = Z[G] ∩ θZ[G].
Theorem 4 ([Was12]). The Stickelberger ideal S is such that for any fractional
ideal h of OK , and for any s ∈ S, the ideal hs is principal. In other words, S
annihilates the ideal class group of K.
Similarly to the log-unit lattice, we know a generating set of relatively short
vectors (namely, the wi’s defined below) of S. Let us define the vectors vi, 2 ≤
i ≤ n + 1 as vi = (ai − σai)θ. The aforementioned vectors wi’s, 2 ≤ i ≤ n + 1
are defined by wi+1 = vi+1 − vi, and we have the following inequality on their
norms from [CDW17, Wes18].
Fact 5 ([Wes18]) For any 2 ≤ i ≤ n+ 1, we have ‖wi‖2 ≤ 2
√
n.
In the case of prime conductors m, Schoof established in [Sch10] that all the
wi’s have ±1 coefficients, in particular ‖wi‖2 =
√
n.
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3 Approx-SVP on Cyclotomic Ideals
3.1 Overview
Building upon [CGS14, EHKS14, CDPR16, BS16], the Approx-SVP algorithm
for cyclotomic ideals of [CDW17] splits in the following 4 steps given below. A
more detailed overview of these recent works is given in [Duc17]. Some details
have been simplified by making use of several working hypotheses summarized
at the end of this section.
Step 1 (quantum): Class-Group Discrete Logarithm. The first step con-
sists in expressing the class [a] of the input ideal a in base B = {pσ|σ ∈ G}
for some prime ideal p, using the quantum poly-time algorithm of [BS16]. Un-
der hypothesis 7, such a decomposition always exists. This algorithm is heavily
based on the quantum algorithm for the Hidden Subgroup Problem over Rn
from [EHKS14]. This provides an element e ∈ Z[G] such that [pe] = [a].
Step 2 (classical): Close Principal Multiple. The second step, introduced
in [CDW17] consists in finding a close principal multiple of a, that is a principal
ideal of the form b = ac where c ⊂ OK is an integral ideal of reasonably small
norm Nc ≤ F . This will allow to focus the search of a short vector to the
(principal) sublattice b ⊂ a.
This is done by finding a point v ∈ S close to e. Setting w = v − e gives
a ‘small’ ideal c = pw such that b = ac is principal. Indeed, [b] = [a][c] =
[p]e[p]v−e = [p]v, and [p]v = [OK ] by Stickelberger’s Theorem.
Yet c is not necessarily integral as coefficients of w ∈ Z[G] can be negative.
This is nevertheless easy to solve under Hypothesis 6, as it then holds that
[p−1] = [pτ ]. This gives the desired b ⊂ OK of bounded norm Nb ≤ p‖w‖1 .
Using the NearestPlane algorithm and an explicit short basis of the augmented
Stickelberger lattice S′ := S+(1+ τ), it is shown in [CDW17] that one can find
a close vector v ∈ S, at `1-distance at most B2
‖w‖1 = ‖v − e‖1 ≤ B2 = O(n3/2). (1)
Assuming Np = poly(n) leads to
Nb/Na = (Np)B2 = exp(O˜(n3/2)). (2)
Step 3 (quantum): Principal Ideal Problem. The next step consist of solv-
ing the Principal Ideal Problem (PIP) on the principal ideal b, that is, finding a
generator h of it: hOK = b. As for the Class-Group Discrete Logarithm Problem,
there is a quantum poly-time algorithm [BS16] for this task.
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Step 4 (classical): Short Generator Problem. The last step consists in
finding a unit u ∈ O×K such that g = uh (which also generates b) has small
norm. As in Step 2, this again can be rephrased as a close-vector problem, this
time in the log-unit lattice Λ = LogO×K .
Using a randomized variant of the RoundOff Algorithm with the explicit
short basis {Log bj , i ∈ I} of the log-unit lattice, it is shown [CDPR16, Theorem
6.3] that for any target H = Span(Λ), one can find a logarithmic unit l ∈ Λ at
distance at most B4 = O(
√
m logm)
‖l − t‖∞ ≤ B4. (3)
From any target t ∈ H. Setting t to be the orthogonal projection of Log h onto
H, and u such that l = Log u leads to a short generator h = gu, of norm bounded
by
‖h‖∞ ≤ (Ng)1/n · exp(‖l − t‖∞) ≤ (Ng)1/n · exp(O(
√
n log n)). (4)
Conclusion. In conclusion, we have found a vector g ∈ b ⊂ a of norm at most:
‖h‖2 ≤
√
n‖h‖∞ ≤
√
n · (Ng)1/n · exp(B4)
≤ √n · (Na)1/n · pB2/n · exp(B4)
≤ Vol(a)1/n · √n ·∆−1/2nK · pB2/n · exp(B4)
≤ Vol(a)1/n · exp(O˜(√n)),
that is, we have solved approx-SVP on the cyclotomic ideal a with an Hermite
factor of η = exp(O˜(
√
n)).
3.2 Slackness of the bounds of Step 4
Note that the 4th step from [CDPR16] makes use of a non-tight bound. Indeed
the exact length of h can be written as
‖h‖2 = (Ng)1/n · ‖Exp(l − t)‖2,
and [CDPR16] simply considers
‖Exp(l − t)‖2 ≤
√
n · exp(‖l − t‖∞).
For our concrete analysis, it is therefore more relevant to define the pseudo-norm
‖ · ‖o : H → [0,+∞)
‖x‖o := ln(‖Exp(x)‖2).
While it holds that ‖x‖o ≤ ‖x‖∞+ ln(
√
n), the slackness of this inequality is
not only induced by the typical `2 − `∞ slackness ‖x‖∞ ≤ ‖x‖2 ≤
√
n‖x‖∞, in
the sense that we can have ‖x‖o 6≥ ‖x‖∞.
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Fig. 1: Greyscale plots comparisons of ‖ · ‖∞ and ‖ · ‖o on the space H for m = 7
(n = 6, dim(H) = n/2 − 1 = 2, H ⊂ Rn/2). The black arrows represent the
projection of the canonical axes of R3 onto H. The blue dots represent the points
of the log-unit lattice Λ = LogO×K . The red cells represent Voronoi partitions.
Indeed, negative coefficients in x contribute very little to ‖x‖o. This is ex-
emplified by having a pathologically negative coefficient: taking x = α(1 −
n/2, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ H where α > 0 we have
‖x‖∞ = α(n/2− 1)
‖x‖o ≤ α+ ln(n).
To represent things more pictorially, let us assume m = 7, for which n =
φ(m) = 6: the space H has dimension n/2 − 1 = 2 and is embedded in R3:
H = {(x, y, z)|x + y + z = 0}. A graphical comparison of ‖ · ‖∞ and ‖ · ‖o is
provided in Figure 1. As we can see, not only the ‖ · ‖∞ is pessimistic, but it can
also lead to a wrong choice for the optimal solution: the Voronoi partitioning
under ‖ · ‖∞ and ‖ · ‖o do differ.
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3.3 Concrete estimation of the Hermite Factor
At the time of writing, the authors do not possess a quantum computer suf-
ficiently powerful to execute the full algorithm. Fortunately, it is nevertheless
possible to simulate the behavior of the Hermite factor, since it depends only
on the behavior of the classical steps 2 and 4. More precisely, assuming that
e mod S′ and t mod Λ are uniform and independent (Hypothesis 8), we can
study experimentally the average behavior of the whole algorithm.
More precisely, having introduced the appropriate pseudo-norm ‖ · ‖o, we can
now write the exact value of the Hermite factor as a function of intermediate
values v − e and l − t as follows:
η = ∆
− 12n
K · exp
(
ln p
n
· ‖v − e‖1 + ‖l − t‖o
)
. (5)
Therefore, we can predict the behavior of η simply by measuring experimentally
the distribution of ‖v−e‖1 and ‖l−t‖o. For comparison with LLL and BKZ, it is
more convenient to consider the root Hermite factor δ = η1/n. For example, for
LLL we have δ ≈ 1.022 according to [NS06], and for BKZ with blocksize β ≥ 50,
both heuristic arguments and experiments [CN11] give
δ ≈
(
(β/(2pie))(βpi)
1
β
) 1
2(β−1)
.
3.4 Working hypotheses
Restriction on the conductor. While the algorithm above has been initially stud-
ied for all prime-power conductors m in [CDW17, CDPR16], and even general-
ized to all conductors in [Wes18], the body of this paper will focus only on prime
conductors m. This avoids numerous case by case discussions. One may prefer
to directly study the case of power of 2 conductors, which is the most common
in applications. However, powers of 2 are too sparse to allow for reasonable ex-
trapolation. We therefore defer it to Appendix A, where we will compare it to
the prime case.
Number-theoretic hypotheses. Two hypotheses are used in the works of [CDW17,
CDPR16] concerning the structure of the class-group. The first is that the size of
the plus-part of the class group h+m (i.e. the size of the class group of the maximal
real subfield) is only polynomial in the conductor m. The second is that one can
construct (by random sampling) a small set of small-norm ideals that generate
the class group as a Z[G]-module.
While these assumptions are sufficient for asymptotic results, they are not
precise enough for a more effective study such as ours. We will therefore, as a
working hypotheses strengthen those assumptions.
Hypothesis 6 The plus-part of the class group is trivial, i.e. h+m = 1.
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Hypothesis 7 The class group is generated by the ideals above the smallest
totally split prime. That is, let p ∈ Z be the smallest prime such that p ≡ 1
mod m, and p ⊂ OK such that Np = p. We assume that [p] generates ClK as a
Z[G]-module, or equivalently that {[pσ]|σ ∈ G} generates ClK as a group.
We will keep the notation p and p as a function of m for the rest of this paper.
For our final conclusion, we will need estimates on p. We note that for prime
conductors m, we necessarly have p ≥ 2m+1. On the other hand, prime density
suggest that “on average” over m we have p ≈ m lnm.
Because of these strengthened hypotheses, our final claims should be inter-
preted as a best-case scenario for the efficiency of those algorithms. We remind
that various computational results suggest that those assumptions are plausible
for a substantial fraction of conductors m [Was12, Sch98, Sch03]. In any case,
the failure of those two hypotheses would not invalidate our lower-bound.
Input distribution. In the light of the worst-case to average-case results of [Mic07,
SSTX09, LPR10, SS11, PRSD17], it would be interesting to study the worst-case
behavior of those algorithms. Alas, finding which input leads to the worst-case is
most likely an intractable problem. We therefore instead assume that the inputs
will be uniform modulo the respective lattices.
Hypothesis 8 The input e ∈ Z[G] of step 2 is uniform in Z[G]/(S + (1 +
τ)Z[G]), and the target t in step 4 is uniform in H/Λ.
Remark 2. The first part of the hypothesis essentially states that the class [a]
of the input ideal a is uniform over Cl = Cl−. Interstingly, the main theorem
of [JW18] allows to randomize the input so as to ensure its uniformity in the
class group, by randomly multiplying it by a few small prime ideals. This only
affects its norm by a factor exp(O˜(n)), which asymptotically has a negligible
impact on the final approximation factor. This implies that we can re-randomize
any instance (even a worst-case one) to an average case one at a small cost.
The second part of the hypothesis can also be enforced by some random-
ization of t. A straightforward approach would be to simply add to t a (short)
random vector r of H uniformly distributed in H/Λ. Reducing r with the good
basis of Λ, this randomization has a limited impact on the final approximation
factor. More precisely, we end up with ‖t− l‖o ≤ ‖t+ r − l‖o + ‖r‖o where both
‖r‖o and ‖t + r − l‖o follow the average case distribution studied in this paper
(yet are not independent). In particular, if the average case gives a solution of
length less than B with probability greater than 2/3, we can find solutions of
length at most 2B in the worst-case, by randomizing on average 3 times.
This loss of a factor 2 should only be read as a preliminary conclusion con-
cerning the worst case. Indeed, heuristically, randomizing the input ideal for the
first step will also rerandomizes the target of the second step. Making such a
statement formal requires generalizing [JW18] to the Arakelov class group; this
is beyond the scope of the present article and left as future work.
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4 Heuristic Improvement for the Close Vector Steps
In this section, we consider potential heuristic improvements for solving the close
vector problems relatively to the log-unit lattice and to the Stickelberger lattice.
Indeed, we note that [CDPR16, CDW17] focus on proving worst-case bounds,
and therefore apply simple and easy to analyse close-vector algorithms, namely
NearestPlane and RoundOff. There are several reasons to think that this can be
improved in practice, as discussed below.
4.1 More Short Vectors to be Exploited
We note that the NearestPlane and RoundOff algorithms are restricted to use
exactly d short vectors for a d-dimensional lattice, while in both cases, we actu-
ally know Θ(d2) short vectors in these lattices. Indeed, for the log-unit lattice
we know the following n/2(n/2− 1) short units:
Log bij = Log
(
1− ζi
1− ζj
)
, i, j ∈ I, i 6= j.
Similarly, in the Stickelberger lattice, we know the following n2 short class rela-
tions:
wiσ, 2 ≤ i ≤ n+ 1, σ ∈ G.
This extra knowledge can be exploited by using algorithms that can take ad-
vantage of many short vectors to solve CVP. In fact, if one knows the set V of
all the Voronoi relevants vector of a lattice of dimension d, one can solve exact-
CVP in O(|V | · poly(d)) arithmetic operations [MV10, DB15]. This is described
as Algorithm 3 (VoronoiCVP). Unfortunately the size of V can be as large as
2d − 2, and the best known algorithm [MV10] to determine it takes time O(4d).
Yet it remains possible to run this algorithm with an approximation of the set
V ′; this has been proposed and analyzed in [Laa16, DLdW19, SD19]. We cannot
apply this analysis in our case because it uses heuristic arguments that are valid
for random lattices, and those heuristics are most likely invalid for the lattices
at hand which are somewhat close to orthogonal. Furthermore, this analysis is
strongly restricted to the Euclidean norm, while we are here interested in other
norms, or even pseudo-norms. But we can nevertheless apply a similar strategy
and see how it behaves experimentally.
Algorithm 3 VoronoiCVP(V, t) ([MV10, Laa16, DLdW19])
c← 0
while ∃v ∈ ±V such that ‖t− c− v‖2 < ‖t− c‖2 do
c← c+ v
end while
return c
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This algorithm can be viewed as a discrete gradient descent, and if V is
indeed the set of Voronoi relevant vectors this descent will stop at an exact
closest vector. Otherwise, the descent can get stuck in a discrete local minima,
and therefore it was also proposed in [Laa16, DLdW19] to randomize the starting
point c = 0 and to take the best results over several descents.
Rather than re-starting from scratch, in practice it seems preferable to con-
tinue the search nearby the current local minima: indeed the descent is done on
a convex function, it is only because it is discretized that it can get stuck, and
we expect the closest point to be not that far from the current point. Proceeding
with such a strategy requires care to avoid looping over a cycle; this is easily
prevented by keeping track of the points visited so far. At last, we also accelerate
the descent by starting from either the NearestPlane or RoundOff approximation;
this also ensures that its result will be at least as good as that of the original
algorithm. The resulting algorithm is detailed in Algorithm 4 (HeuristicCVP),
after the following final tweak.
4.2 Norm inadequacy
Another source of inefficiency comes from the fact that NearestPlane, RoundOff
and even the above VoronoiCVP are attempting to optimize the Euclidean dis-
tance, while for our application what we really want to optimize are the `1-
distance ‖ · ‖1 for Stickelberger lattice, and the pseudo-norm ‖ · ‖o for the
log-unit lattice.
This inadequacy is easily addressed in practice simply by replacing the Eu-
clidean norm ‖ · ‖2 used in our HeuristicCVP algorithm by the desired (pseudo)-
norm ‖ · ‖1 or ‖ · ‖o.
Algorithm 4 HeuristicCVP(B, V, t, S, ‖ · ‖)
c← NearestPlane(B, t) or c← RoundOff(B, t)
C ← {c}
for i ∈ {1, . . . , S} do
c← argminc′ ‖c′ − t‖ where c′ ranges over (c+ V ) \ C
C ← C ∪ {c}
end for
return argminc′ ‖c′ − t‖ where c′ ranges over C
4.3 Dimension-halving for Step 2
Because the Stickelberger ideal S is not full rank as a Z-module in Z[G], the
augmented ideal S′ = S + (1 + τ)Z[G] was introduced in [CDW17], which also
annihilates the class group under the assumption that h+m = 1. Alternatively, it
is proposed in [Wes18] to instead project the lattice and the target down to the
quotient ring Z[G]/(1 + τ). More specifically, let F ⊂ G be such that F and τF
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form a partition of G. We define a projection morphism
pi : Z[G]→ ZF
f ∈ F 7→ f
f ∈ G \ F 7→ −τf
where ZF ' Zn/2 is the Z-module of formal integral sums of elements of F . We
note that there is a reciprocal function pˆi such that for all x ∈ ZF it holds that
pi(pˆi(x)) = x, pˆi(x) has positive coordinates, and ‖pˆi(x)‖1 = ‖x‖1: any x ∈ ZF
can be lifted back to a positive exponent in Z[G] with the same `1 norm, as
needed to solve the Close Principal Multiple problem.
While this tweak from [Wes18] was originally mostly aesthetic as it didn’t
improve the asymptotic analysis, it effectively decreases the dimension of the
problem from n to n/2; we note experimentally that this trick noticeably im-
proved the average length of ‖v − e‖1.
Remark 3. We note during those experiments that the index Vol(S′) = |Z[G]/S′|
(or equivalently the index Vol(pi(S)) = |ZF /pi(S)|) is not equal to h−m, but rather
to 2n/2−1 ·h−m (at least for all primes m ≤ 1000): the representation of a class of
Cl− as an element of Z[G]/S′ is not unique. And indeed, only a weaker statement
is known, namely the theorem of Iwasawa [Sin80, Was12] stating that |((1 −
τ)Z[G])/((1− τ) ∩ S)| = h−m.
5 Implementation and Experiments
5.1 Implementation details
Sources. Our implementation was realized in python3, and exploits the li-
brary numpy. It is provided in open-source for repeatability and review of our
experiments at https://github.com/lducas/Cyclotomic-QISVP-Effective.
The algorithms discussed above are implemented in stickelberger.py and
logunit.py. The script experiments.py provides a convenient command line
interface for running experiments. The script verifications.py provides sanity-
checks, in particular with respect to the construction of the Stickelberger and
log-unit lattices.
Optimizations. The critical computation regarding the performance of Algo-
rithm 4 is the evaluation of the pseudo-norm ‖ ·‖o of x+v. In this loop, x = c− t
is fixed, while v varies over the set V , of size Θ(n2).
Naively, the efficiency of evaluating the pseudo-norm is pretty terrible: not
only does it requires Θ(n) calls to transcendental functions (log, exp), but it also
requires to run the for v ∈ V loop at the python level, inducing interpretation
overheads. We note the following identity:
exp(‖x+ v‖2o ) = ‖Exp(x+ v)‖2 =
∑
e2xi · e2vi = 〈Exp(2x),Exp(2v)〉.
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Since y 7→ exp(y2) is monotonic over [0,+∞), this means that we can actually
determine the minimizing v using a matrix-vector product M · Exp(2x), where
the rows of M are the row vectors
{
Exp(−2v)T |v ∈ V }. Having precomputed
M , this step becomes very fast thanks to the optimized linear algebra library
included in numpy.
Another optimization consists in using a custom hash function H for testing
c′ 6∈ C in algorithm 4. By making this function linear, we can accelerate the
computation of H(c′) = H(c) +H(v).
Numerical stability issues. In the experiment reported below, Figure 2a has been
truncated at dimension 800: after this point the behavior started being erratic.
We strongly suspect that this is due to numerical stability issues during the
Gram-Schmidt Orthogonalization algorithm. Unfortunately, increasing floating
point precision seems difficult within our programming set-up, as python/numpy
does not support more than double precision floats. Perhaps surprisingly, step 4
showed no such issue, at least up to dimension 3000. It may be that matrix
inversion is more numerically stable than Gram-Schmidt, but also that the log-
unit basis is better conditioned than the Stickelberger basis.
5.2 Experimental results
We now report on the behavior of the original algorithms of [CDW17, CDPR16]
and our heuristic improvements. Our experiments are depicted in Figure 2. The
data points are averaged over 100 samples per prime conductor m. For certain
batches of experiments, we may have skipped some conductors so as to obtain
data points for larger conductors in reasonable time. The computation ran for
about a week, using 8 cores (Intel Xeon E5-2650v3 @2.3GHz).
Deviation from average. Before commenting on the average behavior, we first
note that, apart from the naive algorithms, the deviation from average was
extremely small: the standard deviation is smaller than the average by a factor
at least 20 for conductors m ≥ 200, and the gap seems to grow further with the
dimension. This may not entirely dismiss the possibility of rare outliers, but the
bounds from Section 6 will control the probability of outliers.
Experimental effective asymptotics. Our first remark is that the upper bounds
from [CDW17, CDPR16] ‖v−e‖1 = O(n3/2) and ‖l− t‖o = O(
√
n log n) seem to
be reached in practice, i.e., it seems very plausible that ‖v − e‖1 = Θ(n3/2) and
quite plausible ‖l−t‖o = Θ(
√
n log n). More precisely, for the original algorithms,
for large ranks n = ϕ(m) it seems to hold that:
‖v − e‖1 ≈ 0.039 · n3/2, and‖l − t‖o ≈ 0.32 ·
√
n lnn. (6)
Our heuristically improved variant using HeuristicCVP with n3/2 iterations yields
‖v − e‖1 ≈ 0.032 · n3/2, and‖l − t‖o ≈ 0.117 ·
√
n lnn. (7)
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Fig. 2: Average distance given by various CVP algorithms for steps 2 & 4, for
prime conductors m.
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Increased number of iterations for HeuristicCVP. Of course, one would ideally
want to estimate how those constants evolve as the number of iterations for
HeuristicCVP increases. However, such experiments become impractical as this
number grows further than n3/2.
From Figure 2c, we note that increasing the number of iterations beyond n
does not seem to provide significantly better solutions in the log-unit lattice.
No such conclusion can be drawn for the Stickelberger lattice (Figure 2a). For-
tunately, the lower bound studied in Section 6.1, Figure 3, will show that the
solution found with n3/2 iterations is already quite close to optimal.
6 Volumetric Lower Bounds
In this section, we provide probabilistic lower bounds using volumetric argu-
ments. More specifically, we compute a lower bound r := r(L, ‖ · ‖) for the
covering radius of a given lattice L under a given (asymmetric) norm ‖ · ‖. The
following proposition states that most points are at a distance almost r from L.
Proposition 1. Let L be a full-rank lattice in a euclidean vector space V of
dimension d, and let B = {x ∈ V |‖x‖ < 1} be the open unit ball associated to an
(asymetric) norm ‖ · ‖. Let r = (Vol(L)/Vol(B))1/d.
Then, for any α ∈ [0, 1], and for a random vector x such that x mod L is
uniformly distributed, the probability that
‖x− L‖ := min
v∈L
‖x− v‖ ≤ αr
is less than αd. In particular, there exists a vector x ∈ V such that minv∈L ‖x−
v‖ ≥ r.
Proof. We work over the torus V/L, whose total measure is Vol(L). The proba-
bility that ‖x− L‖ ≤ αr is given by
P =
Vol(αrB mod L)
Vol(L)
.
Note that Vol(αrB mod L) ≤ Vol(αrB), with equality if and only if the union⋃
v∈L v + αrB is disjoint. In particular
P ≤ αdrdVol(B)/Vol(L) = αd.
Remark 4. When comparing experimental results to those lower bounds, one
should keep in mind that a gap does not necessarily imply that the algorithm
fails to find the exact closest vector. Indeed, the above bound is tight only for
lattices that are a perfect packing with respect to the considered balls.
For example consider Zn, for which CVP is easy to solve in any `p norm.
It is a perfect packing for the `∞ distance, and we have r(Zn, ‖ · ‖∞) = 1/2,
while the average `∞ distance of a point to Zn is 1/2− o(1). Now, consider Zn
for the `1 distance, which is far from a perfect packing. We have r(Zn, ‖ · ‖1) =
(n!/2n)1/n ≈ n/2e ≈ 0.184 · n, yet the average `1 distance is n/4 = 0.25 · n.
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6.1 Volumetric bound for Step 2
Before we proceed, we must first discuss whether we should apply the lower
bound with or without the dimension halving trick, i.e., whether we should
apply it to the augmented Stickelberger lattice S′ = S + (1 + τ)Z[G], or to the
projected one pi(S). While both have the same volume, the dimension of S′ is
twice the dimension of pi(S), which would give a smaller lower bound. Yet, we
note that pi can only decrease `1 distances, so a lower bound for pi(S) will also
apply to S′.
We have that dim(pi(S)) = n/2 =: d and Vol(pi(S)) = 2d−1h−m. The volume
of the `1 unit ball in dimension d is given by Vol(B1) = 2d/d!. We need an
estimation of h−m. Let
G(m) = 2m(m/4pi2)ϕ(m)/4.
Kummer claimed, without publishing a proof, that for any prime m we have
h−m ∼ G(m). Although this is now believed to be unlikely, Lepistö [Lep74] proved
a weaker (but sufficient here) explicit bound of the form∣∣∣∣log( h−mG(m)
)∣∣∣∣ = O(log(m)).
We deduce that h−m = G(m)eO(log(m)), and therefore h−m
1/d ∼ G(m)1/d. Such an
approximation is numerically satisfied up to a 1% error for primesm ∈ [100, 2000]
by our script verification.py. Using Stirling’s formula, and the facts that
d = n/2 ∼ m/2 (since m is prime) and (2m)1/d ∼ 1, we conclude that
r(pi(S), ‖ · ‖1) ∼
(
2d ·m(m/4pi2)n/4
/
(2e/d)d
)1/d
∼ (m/4pi2)1/2 · (d/e)
∼ 1
4epi
· n3/2 ≈ 0.02927 · n3/2
Adjusting to the integral input setting. While these bounds hold asymptotically,
we note that our experiments violate them for dimensions below 200. The reason
is that in Step 2, the input is an integral vector, uniform in ZF /pi(S), and not
uniform in RF /pi(S) as required by Proposition 1. However, we can rather easily
adjust to this setting, by counting integral points Nd,b = |bB1 ∩ Zd| in the ball
of radius b. Using dynamic programming, Nd,b is easily computed in polynomial
time thanks to the following recursion:
Nd,0 = 1, N1,b = 2b+ 1, Nd,b = Nd−1,b + 2
b∑
k=1
Nd−1,b−k.
For our concrete lower bound, we can therefore take r to be the largest
integer such that Nd,r ≤ |ZF /pi(S)|. This is depicted in Figure 3, and compared
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to the performance of our algorithm HeuristicCVP. We note (as expected) that
the asymptotic behavior is similar to our continuous volumetric analysis above.
Fig. 3: Numerically computed volumetric lower bounds: maximal r such that
Nd,r ≤ |ZF /pi(S)|, compared to the experimental behavior of HeuristicCVP.
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Remark 5. In the above analysis, we have accounted for the factor 2n/2−1 that
separates the lattice of (augmented) Stickelberger class relations from the full lat-
tice of class relations (see Remark 3). While we are currently uncertain whether
or not this factor is unavoidable, we note that its impact is asymptotically very
simple: it contributes a factor 2 to our lower bound. Therefore, one may prefer
the rely on a halved lower bound.
6.2 Volumetric bound for Step 4
We start by noting that we cannot apply Proposition 1 directly to our pseudo-
norm, the issue being the lack of homogeneity: {x ∈ H | ‖x‖o ≤ r} 6= r · {x ∈ H |
‖x‖o ≤ 1}. Fortunately, there seems to be a reasonably close asymmetric norm
‖x‖+∞ = maxi xi that can be used to bound the pseudo-norm ‖x‖o. 5 Note
that, on the space H, it differs from the usual `∞ norm by ignoring negative
coefficients. For any x ∈ H, we have the inequalities
‖x‖+∞ + ln(
√
n) ≥ ‖x‖o ≥ ‖x‖+∞ + ln(
√
2) (8)
The asymmetric unit ball B+∞ for the ‖ · ‖+∞ asymmetric norm is the (d− 1)-
simplex whose d vertices that are a permutation of (1, . . . , 1, 1 − d). Its volume
is given by Vol(B+∞) = dd−1/2/(d− 1)!, and we have Vol(B+∞)1/(d−1) → e.
5 To verify that ‖ · ‖+∞ is indeed an asymmetric norm over H, we recall that vector
space H is {x ∈ Rd|∑xi = 0}: there is always one coordinate that is positive.
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On the other hand, According to Theorem 3, the root volume of the log-
unit lattice satisfies Vol(Λ)1/(d−1) ∼ √n/2 for any prime conductors m. Such
an approximation is numerically satisfied up to a 1% error for primes m ∈
[100, 2000], as can be verified with the script verification.py. We therefore
conclude that:
r(Λ, ‖ · ‖+∞) ∼
√
n
2e
≈ 0.1839 · √n (9)
Remark 6. We note that our concrete lower bound is also asymptotically better
than the one given in [CDPR16]. The reason is that it is based on Theorem 3
stating that Vol(Λ)1/(d−1) ∼ √n/2, while [CDPR16] relied on the inequality
Vol(Λ)1/(d−1) ≥ Ω(√n/ log n). This 1/ log(n) factor comes from cumulating the
approximation factors from Landau’s estimate for L-functions at 1 [Lan27] over
all non-trivial character. Our Theorem 3 shows that Landau’s approximations
essentially cancel out under geometric average over all characters.
Fig. 4: Numerically computed lower bound r := r(Λ, ‖·‖+∞)+ln(
√
2), compared
to the experimental behavior of HeuristicCVP.
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7 Conclusion
7.1 Summary
In Table 1 we summarize the asymptotic behavior of the algorithms and lower
bounds studied in the previous sections.
Recall from formula (5) that the Hermite factor is
η = ∆
− 12n
K · exp
(
ln p
n
· ‖v − e‖1 + ‖l − t‖o
)
,
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Table 1: Asymptotic summary.
Step 2 Step 4
‖v − e‖1 ‖l − t‖o
Naive algorithms from [CDW17, CDPR16] 0.039 · n3/2 0.32 · √n lnn
HeuristicCVP with n3/2 iterations 0.032 · n3/2 0.117 · √n lnn
Volumetric lower bound 0.02927 · n3/2 0.1839 · √n
Halved volumetric lower bound (Remark 5) 0.01463 · n3/2 N/A
where p is the smallest prime such that p ≡ 1 mod m. We can now predict the
concrete Hermite factor of the quantum algorithms for Ideal-SVP.
7.2 Comparison with classical algorithms
We now compare our prediction to the classical algorithms LLL and BKZ. For
this comparison, we will consider the smallest possible value for p = 2m+1 and
the expected value p = m lnm derived from prime density. This comparison is
provided in Figure 5, using the root Hermite factor δ = η1/n.
We provide the reference root Hermite factors for LLL and BKZ with block-
sizes β ∈ {80, 120, 160, 300}. The LLL algorithm is the cheapest lattice reduc-
tion available, and it should be noted that the quantum steps [EHKS14] 1 and
3 also make several quantum calls to LLL: the computational cost of the quan-
tum algorithm is therefore bounded below by the cost of LLL.6 The cost of
BKZ grows exponentially or even super-exponentially with β, depending on the
choice of algorithm. Nevertheless, BKZ-80 remains a reasonably easy computa-
tion (say, about 8m core-minutes), while BKZ-120 is to be considered doable
(8m core-days). Running BKZ-160 is on the borderline of feasible: to this date,
computational records almost correspond to one out of the ≈ 8m steps of such
a lattice reduction [ADH+19, SG10]. Finally, BKZ-300 is roughly what is re-
quired to break the weakest lattice-based candidates to the NIST post-quantum
standardization [ACD+18].
7.3 Conclusion
Our first conclusion is that the naive version of the quantum algorithm is not
relevant for rings of ranks considered practical for use in cryptography, as it
does not outperform classically feasible computation (BKZ-120) before prime
6 Unfortunately, while proved polynomial times, the algorithms of [EHKS14, BS16]
have, to our knowledge not been the subject of refined complexity analysis. But
already, one can note that the lower bound we suggest is far from tight, considering
the overheads of running LLL quantumly rather than classically, and this, many
times.
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Fig. 5: Quality of Quantum Ideal-SVP vs. LLL and BKZ.
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conductor m ≈ 32000. Nevertheless, our heuristic improvements allow to de-
crease this cross-over point down to m ≈ 6000. Such a dimension is still one
order of magnitude larger than what is used for NIST post-quantum standard-
ization candidates, but is within the range of what is used by certain concrete
Fully Homomorphic Encryption schemes, for example [HS15].
Finally, one may fear that further tricks could improve the heuristic CVP
steps within [CDPR16, CDW17], and maybe reach the lower bound.7 The con-
clusion is somewhat reassuring for NIST candidates, as the cross-over point with
BKZ-300 should not happen before ring rank n ≈ 6000, even given a perfect CVP
oracle for the Log-unit lattice and the Stickelberger lattice: NIST candidates use
cyclotomic rings of rank at most n = 1024.
While the body of this article is focused on prime conductors m, we also
considered the powers of 2 conductors, and found that both the experimental
behavior and the numerical lower bounds were slightly worse in the powers of 2
case. This is reported in Appendix A.
7 We recall that this bound is plausibly not tight, that is, even a perfect CVP oracle
may not be able to reach it; see Remark 4.
24
7.4 Limitations
To avoid any over-interpretation of our results, we summarize here the limits of
what can be concluded from the present work.
Limitation of the lower bounds. We first remind that this lower-bound is only
probabilistic, i.e., Proposition 1 states that the probability that a target falls
closer to the lattice by a factor α < 1 is at most αd. That is, it may not be
impossible to rerandomize the input to bruteforce a better solution, but it will
raise the cost of the algorithm to exponential time.
Moreover, it should be noted that these lower bounds apply only to algo-
rithms that are slight variations of [CDPR16, CDW17]. It has been proved that
ideas beyond this framework make it asymptotically possible to go below those
lower bounds [PMHS19], but at the cost of a sub-exponential running time,
together with an exponential amount of precomputation.
Limitation of the cryptanalytic impact. On the other hand, we also remind the
reader that we have made several working assumptions for the sake of simplicity,
putting ourselves in the most favorable set-up. In particular, if one were to need
not 1 but 2 ideals to generate the class group, this would asymptotically double
the constant for Step 2.
Most importantly, we also recall that this work only studies the concreteness
of the first obstacle discussed in our introduction, while the second obstacle
remains unsolved. That is, these results concern only Ideal-SVP, and it remains
unclear how they could be generalized to Ring-SIS, Ring-LWE, or NTRU.
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A The power of 2 case
In this section we compare the power of 2 case to the prime case. The experi-
mental behavior and lower bounds for step 2 and step 4 are given in Figure 6.
We see that the asymptotic lower bounds for the power of 2 case is similar to
the prime case, yet for both step 2 and 4, the experimental behavior is sligthly
worse for the power of 2 case.
We also need to account for the inverse root discriminant, which is also a
factor in final Hermite factor η given by Formula (5). A quick calculation shows
that this factor is a similar function of the rank n in both cases. Indeed, when
m is prime, the inverse root discriminant |∆K |−1/2n appearing in the formula
for the root Hermite factor (5) is given by
|∆K |−1/2n = m−(n−1)/2n ∼ 1/
√
m ∼ 1/√n.
On the other hand for m = 2k we have
|∆K |−1/2n = 2−n(k−1)/2n = 2(1−k)/2 =
√
2/m = 1/
√
n.
In conclusion, we expect that the quantum algorithm for Ideal-SVP at hand pro-
vides vectors slightly longer for power of 2 conductors than for prime conductors.
B Estimation of the regulator
In this appendix we prove Theorem 3, which states that for any prime power
m = pk, we have (Vol(Λ)/h+)
1
n/2−1 ∼ √m/2. First, we recall that the volume of
the log-unit lattice is related to the so-called regulator R of K by the formula8
Vol(Λ) =
R
√
n/2
2n/2−1
.
Therefore Vol(Λ)
1
n/2−1 ∼ R 1n/2−1 /2, and it remains to estimate Rh+. Let
∆K+ denote the discriminant of K+, the maximal real subfield of K. We have
that |∆K+ | = |∆K/p|1/2 when m is a power of p 6= 2 (for p = 2, the following
8 The denominator 2n/2−1 may not be standard in the litterature, and is due to our
definition of the logarithmic embedding. Indeed since the field at hand is totally
complex, we only use one embedding from each pair of conjugate embeddings.
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Fig. 6: Comparison of the prime conductors and power of 2 conductor.
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(b) Step 4: behavior of ‖l − t‖o
200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600
0.2
0.3
0.4
n
‖l
−
t‖
o/
√ n
HeuristicCVP with n1 iter, prime m.
HeuristicCVP with n1 iter, power of 2 m.
Volumetric lower bound, prime m.
Volumetric lower bound, power of 2 m.
29
results should adjust for the fact that |∆K+ | = |∆K/4|1/2). From [Was12, p.42],
we get
Rh+ = |∆K/p|1/4
∏
χ 6=1 even
L(1, χ),
where the product is over all non-trivial even Dirichlet characters modulo m. We
have
log
 ∏
χ 6=1 even
L(1, χ)
 = −∑
χ
∑
q
log
(
1− χ(q)
q
)
=
∑
χ
∑
q
∞∑
i=1
χ(qi)
iqi
=
∑
q
∞∑
i=1
1
iqi
∑
χ
χ(qi).
Since ∑
χ
χ(a) =
{
n/2− 1 if a ≡ ±1 mod m,
−1 otherwise,
we deduce that
log
 ∏
χ 6=1 even
L(1, χ)
 = lim
x→∞
n− 22 ∑
qi≤x
qi≡±1 mod m
1
iqi
−
∑
qi≤x
qi 6≡±1 mod m
1
iqi
 .
Let us first deal with the terms where i = 1. From [Pom77], for any a such that
(a,m) = 1, we have
∑
q≤x
q≡a mod m
1
q
=
log log(x)
n
+
1
P (m, a)
+O
(
log(m)
n
)
,
where P (m, a) is the first prime q such that q ≡ a mod m. We get
lim
x→∞
n− 22 ∑
q≤x
q≡±1 mod m
1
q
−
∑
q≤x
q 6≡±1 mod m
1
q

=
n− 2
2P (m, 1)
+
n− 2
2P (m,−1) −
∑
a∈{2,...,m−2}
(a,m)=1
1
P (m, a)
+O(log(m))
= O(log(m)).
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For the terms where i ≥ 2, we have from [AC49] that∑
i≥2
∑
qi≤x
qi≡±1 mod m
1
iqi
= O(1/m).
The proof in [AC49] is given for m prime, but is easily adapted to powers of
primes. We deduce that
log
 ∏
χ 6=1 even
L(1, χ)
 = O(log(m)).
We get the estimate
(
Rh+
) 1
n/2−1 = p
pk−1(pk−k−1)−1
2(n−2) eO(
log(m)
n ) = m
1
2+o(1),
from which we conclude that (Vol(Λ)/h+)
1
n/2−1 ∼ √m/2.
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